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Classical and Quantum Logics with Multiple and a Common Lattice Models
Mladen Pavicˇic´∗
Department of Physics—Nanooptics, Faculty of Mathematics and
Natural Sciences, Humboldt University of Berlin, Germany and
Center of Excellence for Advanced Materials and Sensing Devices (CEMS),
Photonics and Quantum Optics Unit, Ruder Bosˇkovic´ Institute, Zagreb, Croatia
We consider a proper propositional quantum logic and show that it has multiple disjoint lattice
models, only one of which is an orthomodular lattice (algebra) underlying Hilbert (quantum) space.
We give an equivalent proof for the classical logic which turns out to have disjoint distributive and
non-distributive ortholattices as its models. In particular, we prove that quantum as well as classical
logics are complete and sound with respect to these lattices. We also show that there is one common
non-orthomodular lattice that is a model of both quantum and classical logics. In technical terms,
that enables us to run the same classical logic on both a digital (standard, two subset, 0-1 bit)
computer and on a non-digital (say, a six subset) computer (with appropriate chips and circuits).
With quantum logic, the same six element common lattice can serve us as a benchmark for an
efficient evaluation of equations of bigger lattice models or theorems of the logic.
I. INTRODUCTION: IS LOGIC EMPIRICAL?
In his seminal paper Is Logic Empirical? [1], Hilary
Putnam argues that logic we make use of to handle the
statements and propositions of the theories we employ to
describe the world around us is uniquely determined by
it. “Logic is empirical . It makes . . . sense to speak of
‘physical logic’. We live in a world with a non-classical
logic [of subspaces of the quantum Hilbert space H which
form an orthomodular (non-distributive, non-Boolean)
lattice]. Certain statements—just the ones we encounter
in daily life—do obey classical logic, but this is so be-
cause the corresponding subspaces of H form a Boolean
lattice.” [1, Ch. V]
We see that Putnam, in effect, reduces the logics to
lattices, while they should only be their models. “[We]
just read the logic off from the Hilbert space H.” [1,
Ch. III] This technical approach has often been adopted
in both classical and quantum logics. In classical logic, it
has been known as two-valued interpretation for more
than a century. In quantum logic, since G. Birkhoff
and J. von Neumann introduced it in 1935 [2] and it is
still embraced by many authors [3]. Subsequently, vari-
eties of relational logic formulations, which closely follow
lattice ordering relations, have been developed, e.g., by
Dishkant [4], Goldblatt [5], Dalla Chiara [6], Nishimura
[7, 8], Mittelstaedt [9], Stachow [10], and Pta´k and Pul-
mannova´ [11]. More recently, Engesser and Gabbay [12]
made related usage of non-monotonic consequence rela-
tion, Rawling and Selesnick [13] of binary sequent, Her-
but [14] of state-dependent implication of lattice of pro-
jectors in the Hilbert space, Tylec and Kus´ [15] of par-
tially ordered set (poset) map, Bikchentaev, Navara, and
Yakushev [16] of poset binary relation.
Another version of Birkhoff-von-Neumann style of
viewing propositions as projections in Hilbert space
∗ pavicic@irb.hr; http://www.irb.hr/users/mpavicic
rather than closed subspaces and their lattices as in the
original Birkhoff-von Neumann paper has been intro-
duced by Engesser, Gabbay, and Lehmann [17]. Recently,
other versions of quantum logics have been developed,
such as a dynamic quantum logic by Baltag and Smets
[18, 19], exogenous quantum propositional logic by Ma-
teus and Sernadas [20], a categorical quantum logic by
Abramsky and Duncan [21, 22], and a projection orthoal-
gebraic approach to quantum logic by Harding [23].
However, we are interested in non-relational logics
which combine propositions according to a set of true
formulas/axioms and rules imposed on them. The propo-
sitions correspond to statements from a theory, say clas-
sical or quantum mechanics, and are not directly linked
to particular measurement values. Such logics employ
models which evaluate a particular combination of propo-
sitions and tell us whether it is true or not. Evaluation
means mapping from a set of logic propositions to an
algebra, e.g., a lattice, through which a correspondence
with measurement values emerges, but indirectly. There-
fore we shall consider a classical and a quantum logic
defined as a set of axioms whose Lindenbaum-Tarski al-
gebras of equivalence classes of expressions from appro-
priate lattices correspond to the models of the logics. Let
us call such a logic an axiomatic logic.
We show that an axiomatic logic is wider than its rela-
tional logic variety in the sense of having many possible
models and not only distributive ortholattice (Boolean al-
gebra) for the classical logic and not only orthomodular
lattice for the quantum logic. We make use of Hilbert-
Ackermann’s presentation [24] of axiomatic classical logic
in the schemata form and of Kalmbach’s axiomatic quan-
tum logic [25, 26] (in Megill-Pavicˇic´ [27, 28] presentation,
i.e., without Kalmbach’s A1,A11 & A15 axioms which we
prove redundant in [29]), as typical examples of axiomatic
logics.
It is well-known that there are many interpretations of
the classical logic, e.g., two-valued, general Boolean alge-
bra (distributive ortholattice), set-valued ones, etc. [30,
Ch. 8,9]. These different interpretations are tantamount
2to different models of the classical logic and in this paper
and several previous papers of ours we show that they are
enabled by different definitions of the relation of equiva-
lence for its different Lindenbaum-Tarski algebras. One
model of the classical logic is a distributive numerically
valued, mostly two-valued, lattice, while the others are
non-distributive non-orthomodular lattices, one of them
being the so-called O6 lattice, which can also be given
set-valuations [30, Ch. 8,9].
As for quantum logic, one of its models is an orthomod-
ular lattice, while others are non-orthomodular lattices,
one of them being again O6—the common model of both
logics.
Within a logic we establish a unique deduction of all
logic theorems from valid algebraic equations in a model
and vice versa by proving the soundness and complete-
ness of logic with respect to a chosen model. That means
that we can infer the distributivity or orthomodularity in
one model and disprove them in another by means of the
same set of logical axioms and theorems. We can also
consider O6 in which both the distributivity and ortho-
modularity fail; however, particular non-distributive and
non-orthomodular conditions pass O6 only to map into
the distributivity and orthomodularity through classical
and quantum logics in other models of these logics.
We see that logic is at least not uniquely empirical
since it can simultaneously describe distinct realities.
The paper is organised as follows. In Sec. II we define
classical and quantum logics. In Sec. III we introduce
distributive (ortho)lattices and orthomodular lattices as
well as two non-distributive (one is O6) and four non-
orthomodular ones (one is again O6), all of which are
our models for classical and quantum logic, respectively.
In Subec. IVA, we prove soundness and in Subec. IVB
completeness of classical and quantum logics with respect
to the models introduced in Sec.III. In Sec. V, we discuss
the obtained results.
II. LOGICS
We consider logic (L) to be a language which is defined
by a set of conditions (axioms) and rules imposed on
propositions. axioms and the rules of inference. We shall
consider quantum as well as classical axiomatic logics.
The propositions in our axiomatic logic (L) are well-
formed formulae (wffs), which we define as follows.
Primitive (elementary) propositions are denoted as
p0, p1, p2, ...; primitive connectives are ¬ (negation) and
∨ (disjunction). pj is a wff for j = 0, 1, 2, ...; ¬A is a wff
if A is a wff; A ∨B is a wff if A and B are wffs.
We define operations as follows.
Definition II.1 (Conjunction)
A ∧B
def
= ¬(¬A ∨ ¬B).
Definition II.2 (Classical implication)
A→c B
def
= ¬A ∨B.
Definition II.3 (Kalmbach’s implication)
A→3 B
def
= (¬A∧¬B)∨(¬A∧B)∨(A∧(¬A∨B)).
Definition II.4 (Quantum equivalence)
A ≡q B
def
= (¬A ∧ ¬B) ∨ (A ∧B).
Definition II.5 (Classical Boolean equivalence)
A ≡c B
def
= (B →c A) ∧ (A→c B).
Connectives bind in the following order→, ≡, ∨, ∧, ¬,
from weakest to strongest.
F◦ is a set of all wffs. Algebra F = 〈F◦,¬,∨〉 is built
within L with wffs containing ∨ and ¬ by means of a set
of axioms and rules of inference. In that way we get other
expressions called theorems (axioms are also theorems).
We make use of symbol ⊢ to denote the set of theorems;
therefore A ∈ ⊢ means that A is a theorem; it can also be
written as ⊢ A. We read it as: “A is provable,” to mean:
if A is a theorem, then there is a proof of it. We present
our systems of axioms in the schemata form, so that we
do not have to make use of the rule of substitution.
Definition II.6 For Γ ⊆ F◦, A is derivable from Γ:
Γ ⊢L A (or simply Γ ⊢ A) if there is a finite sequence of
wffs, the last one of which is A, and every one of them is
either an axiom of L or a member of Γ or obtained from
its precursors by means of the rule of inference of L.
A. Classical Logic
In the classical logic CL, the sign ⊢CL denotes provabil-
ity from the axioms via the rule of inference. We shall
drop the subscript when it follows from context, e.g., in
the following axioms and the rule of inference that define
CL.
Axioms
A1 ⊢ A ∨A→c A (1)
A2 ⊢ A→c B ∨A (2)
A3 ⊢ B ∨ A→c A ∨B (3)
A4 ⊢ (A→c B)→c (C ∨ A→c C ∨B) (4)
Rule of Inference (traditionally called Modus Ponens)
R1 ⊢ A & A→c B ⇒ ⊢ B (5)
No particular valuations of the primitive propositions
wffs consist of are assumed. We are only interested in
whether wffs that are valid, i.e., true under all possible
valuations of the underlying models. We show that the
wffs that can be inferred from the axioms by means of the
rule inference are exactly those that are valid by proving
the soundness and completeness of the logic.
3B. Quantum Logic
Quantum logic (QL) is defined as a language consist-
ing of propositions and connectives (operations) as in-
troduced above, and the following axioms and a rule of
inference. We will use ⊢QL to denote provability from
the axioms and the rule of QL and omit the subscript
when it is obvious from the context, e.g., in the list of
axioms and the rule of inference that follow.
Axioms
A2 ⊢ A ≡q B →c (B ≡q C →c A ≡q C) (6)
A3 ⊢ A ≡q B →c ¬A ≡q ¬B (7)
A4 ⊢ A ≡q B →c A ∧ C ≡q B ∧ C (8)
A5 ⊢ A ∧B ≡q B ∧ A (9)
A6 ⊢ A ∧ (B ∧ C) ≡q (A ∧B) ∧C (10)
A7 ⊢ A ∧ (A ∨B) ≡q A (11)
A8 ⊢ ¬A ∧ A ≡q (¬A ∧A) ∧B (12)
A9 ⊢ A ≡q ¬¬A (13)
A10 ⊢ ¬(A ∨B) ≡q ¬A ∧ ¬B (14)
A12 ⊢ (A ≡q B) ≡q (B ≡q A) (15)
A13 ⊢ A ≡q B →c (A→c B) (16)
A14 ⊢ (A→c B)→3 (A→3 (A→3 B)) (17)
Rule of Inference
R1 ⊢ A & ⊢ A→3 B ⇒ ⊢ B (18)
Soundness and completeness for quantum logic we
prove below show that the theorems which can be in-
ferred from A1-14 via R1 are exactly those that are valid.
III. LATTICES
For the presentation of the main result it would be
pointless and definitely unnecessary complicated to work
with the full-fledged models, i.e., Hilbert space, and the
new non-Hilbert models that would be equally complex.
It would be equally too complicated to present complete
quantum or classical logic of the second order with all
the quantifiers. Instead, we shall deal with lattices and
the propositional logics we introduced in Sec. II. We start
with a general lattice which contains all the other lattices
we shall use later on. The lattice is called an ortholattice
and we shall first briefly present how one arrives at it
starting with Hilbert space.
A Hilbert lattice is a kind of orthomodular lattice (see
Def. III.5). In it the operation meet , a∩b, corresponds to
set intersection, Ha
⋂
Hb of subspaces Ha and Hb of the
Hilbert space H; the ordering relation a ≤ b corresponds
to Ha ⊆ Hb; the operation join, a ∪ b, corresponds to
the smallest closed subspace of H containing Ha
⋃
Hb;
and the orthocomplement a′ corresponds to H⊥a , the set
of vectors orthogonal to all vectors in Ha. Within the
Hilbert space there is the operation Ha+Hb (sum of two
subspaces); it is defined as as the set of sums of vectors
from Ha and Hb but it has no a parallel in the Hilbert
lattice. The following Ha +H
⊥
a = H holds.
One can define all the lattice operations on the Hilbert
space itself following the above definitions (Ha ∩ Hb =
Ha
⋂
Hb, etc.). Thus we have Ha ∪ Hb = Ha +Hb =
(Ha + Hb)
⊥⊥ = (H⊥a
⋂
H⊥b )
⊥, [31, p. 175] where Hc is
the closure of Hc, and therefore Ha + Hb ⊆ Ha ∪ Hb.
For a finite dimensional H or for the orthogonal closed
subspaces Ha and Hb we have Ha +Hb = Ha ∪Hb. [32,
pp. 21-29], [25, pp. 66,67], [9, pp. 8-16].
For vector x ∈ H that has a unique decomposition x =
y+z for y ∈ Ha and z ∈ H
⊥
a there is a projection Pa(x) =
y associated with Ha. The closed subspace which belong
to P is HP = {x ∈ H|P (x) = x}. Let Pa ∩ Pb denote a
projection on Ha ∩Hb, Pa ∪Pb a projection on Ha ∪Hb,
Pa + Pb a projection on Ha + Hb if Ha ⊥ Hb, and let
Pa ≤ Pb means Ha ⊆ Hb. Then a ∩ b corresponds to
Pa ∩ Pb = limn→∞(PaPb)
n,[9, p. 20] a′ to I − Pa, a ∪ b
to Pa ∪ Pb = I − limn→∞[(I − Pa)(I − Pb)]
n,[9, p. 21]
and a ≤ b to Pa ≤ Pb. a ≤ b also corresponds to either
Pa = PaPb or to Pa = PbPa or to Pa − Pb = Pa∩b′ . Two
projectors commute iff their associated closed subspaces
commute. This means that a∩(a′∪b) ≤ b corresponds to
PaPb = PbPa. In the latter case we have: Pa∩Pb = PaPb
and Pa ∪ Pb = Pa + Pb − PaPb. a ⊥ b, i.e., Pa ⊥ Pb
is characterised by PaPb = 0. [31, pp. 173-176], [25,
pp. 66,67], [9, pp. 18-21], [33, pp. 47-50],
Closed subspaces Ha,Hb,. . . as well as the corre-
sponding projectors Pa,Pb,. . . form an algebra called the
Hilbert lattice which is an ortholattice. The conditions
of the following definition can be easily read off from
the properties of the aforementioned Hilbert subspaces
or projectors.
Definition III.1 An ortholattice (OL) is an algebra
〈OL0,
′ ,∪,∩〉 in which for any a, b, c ∈ OL0 [34] the fol-
lowing conditions hold
a′′ = a (19)
a ∪ (a ∩ b) = a (20)
a ∪ b = b ∪ a (21)
a ∩ b = (a′ ∪ b ′)′ (22)
a ∪ (b ∪ b ′) = b ∪ b ′ (23)
(a ∪ b) ∪ c = a ∪ (b ∪ c) (24)
Since b ∪ b′ = a ∪ a ′ for any a, b ∈ OL0, we define the
least and the greatest elements of the lattice:
0
def
=a ∩ a′, 1
def
=a ∪ a′, (25)
and the ordering relation (≤) on the lattice:
a ≤ b
def
⇐⇒ a ∩ b = a ⇐⇒ a ∪ b = b, (26)
Definition III.2 (Sasaki hook)
a→1 b
def
= a′ ∪ (a ∩ b) (27)
4Definition III.3 (Quantum equivalence)
a ≡q b
def
= (a ∩ b) ∪ (a′ ∩ b ′). (28)
Definition III.4 (Classical equivalence)
a ≡c b
def
= (a′ ∪ b) ∩ (b ′ ∪ a). (29)
Connectives bind in the following order→, ≡, ∪, ∩,
and ′, from weakest to strongest.
Definition III.5 (Pavicˇic´, [35].) An orthomodular lat-
tice (OML) is an OL in which condition (30) (called or-
thomodularity) holds
a ≡q b = 1 ⇒ a = b. (30)
Every Hilbert space (finite and infinite) and every
phase space is orthomodular.
Definition III.6 (Pavicˇic´, [36].)[37] A distributive or-
tholattice (DL) (also called a Boolean algebra) is an OL
in which condition (31) (called distributivity) holds
a ≡c b = 1 ⇒ a = b. (31)
Every phase space is distributive and, of course, or-
thomodular since every distributive ortholattice is ortho-
modular.
The opposite directions of meta-implications in
Eqs. (30) and (31) hold in any OL.
Definition III.7 (Pavicˇic´ and Megill, [27].) A weakly
orthomodular ortholattice (WOML) is an OL in which
either of conditions (32,33) (called weak orthomodular-
ity) hold
a→1 b = 1 ⇒ b
′ →1 a
′ = 1, (32)
a ≡ b = 1 ⇒ (a ∪ c) ≡ (b ∪ c) = 1. (33)
Definition III.8 (Pavicˇic´, this paper.) A WOML1 is a
WOML in which
[(a→1 b) ≡ (b→1 a)] = (a ≡ b) (34)
holds.
Definition III.9 (Pavicˇic´, this paper.) A WOML2 is a
WOML1 in which
[(a ≡ b)′ →1 a
′] = (a→1 b) (35)
holds.
Definition III.10 (Pavicˇic´, this paper.) A WOML* is
a WOML in which neither Eq. (30), nor (35), nor (34)
hold.
Definition III.11 (Pavicˇic´ and Megill, [27, 38].) A
weakly distributive ortholattice (WDL) is an OL in
which condition (36) (called commensurability) holds
(a ∩ b) ∪ (a ∩ b′) ∪ (a′ ∩ b) ∪ (a′ ∩ b′) = 1. (36)
Definition III.12 (Pavicˇic´ and Megill, [27].) A weakly
distributive ortholattice (WDL) is a WOML in which
condition (37) (called weak distributivity) holds
a ∪ (b ∩ c) ≡c (a ∪ b) ∩ (a ∪ c) = 1. (37)
Definitions III.11 and III.12 are equivalent. We give
both definitions here in order to, on the one hand, stress
that aWDL is a lattice in which all variables are commen-
surable and, on the other, to show that in WDL the dis-
tributivity holds only in its weak form given by Eq. (37)
which we will use later on.
Definition III.13 (Pavicˇic´ and Megill, [38]) A WDL*
is a WDL in which Eq. (31) does not hold.
We represent finite lattices by a Hasse diagrams
which consist of vertices (dots) and edges (lines that con-
nect dots). Each dot represents an element in a lattice,
and positioning an element a above another element b
and connecting them by a line means a ≤ b. E.g., in
Fig. 1 (a) we have 0 ≤ x ≤ y ≤ 1. There, for instance, x
is not in a relation with either x′ or y′.
The statement “orthomodularity (30) does not hold
in WOML*” reads ∼[(∀a, b ∈ WOML∗)((a≡ b = 1) ⇒
(a = b))] what we can write as (∃a, b∈WOML∗)(a≡b=
1 & a 6= b), where “∼” is a meta-negation and “&” a
meta-conjuction. An example of a WOML* is O6 from
Fig. 1 (a) and we can easily check the statement on it.
O6 is also an example of a WDL* and we can verify the
statement “distributivity (31) does not hold in WDL*”
on it, as well. Similarly, “condition (35) does not hold in
WOML*” we can write as (∃a, b∈WOML∗)(((a≡b)′ →1
a′) 6= (a→1 b)).
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FIG. 1. (a) O6; (b) O7 (Beran, Fig. 7b [39]); (c) O8 (Rose--
Wilkinson-1 [40])
Definition III.14 (Pavicˇic´, this paper.) A WOML1* is
a WOML1 in which neither Eq. (30) nor (35) hold.
5An example of a WOML1* is O7 from Fig. 1 (b).
Definition III.15 (Pavicˇic´, this paper.) A WOML2* is
a WOML2 in which Eq. (30) does not hold.
An example of a WOML2* is O8 from Fig. 1 (c).
Lemma III.1 OML is properly included in (i.e., it is
stronger than) WOML2, WOML2 is properly included in
WOML1, and WOML1 is properly included in WOML,
Proof. Eq. (32) passes O6, O7, and O8 from Fig. 1.
Eq. (34) passes O7 and O8, but fails in O6. Eq. (35)
passes O8 but fails in both O6 and O7. Eq. (30) fails in
O6, O7, and O8. To find the failures and passes we used
our program lattice [41]. 
Lemma III.2 OML is included in neither WOML2*,
nor WOML1*, nor WOML*. WOML2* is included in
neither WOML1*, nor WOML*. WOML1* is not in-
cluded in WOML*.
Proof. The proof straightforwardly follows from the
one of Lemma III.1 and the definitions of WOML*,
WOML1*, WOML2*, and OML. 
According to Definitions III.10, III.14, III.15, and
III.13, of WOML*, WOML1*, WOML2*, and WDL*, re-
spectively, these lattices denote set-theoretical differences
and that is going to play a crucial role in our proofs of
completeness in Subsection IVB in contrast to [27] where
we considered only WOML without excluding the ortho-
modular equation. In Subsection IVB we shall come back
to this decisive difference between the two approaches.
Note that the set-differences are not equational varieties.
For instance, WOML2* is a WOML2 in which the ortho-
modularity condition does not hold, but we cannot obtain
WOML2* from WOML2 by adding new equational con-
ditions to those defining WOML2. Instead, WOML2*
can be viewed as a set of lattices in all of which the or-
thomodularity condition is violated.
Remarks on implications . As we could see above, the
implications do not play any decisive role in the def-
inition of lattices, especially not in the definitions of
OML and DL where they do not appear at all, and
they also do not play a decisive role in the definition
of logics. A few decades ago that was a major issue,
though: “A ‘logic’ without an implication ... is radically
incomplete, and hardly qualifies as a theory of deduc-
tion” [42] and a hunt to find a “proper implication”
among the five possible ones was pursued in 1970ies and
1980ies [43–45]. Apart from →1 and →3 it turns out
[25] that one can also define a→0 b
def
= a′ ∪ b (classical),
a →2 b
def
= b′ →1 a
′ (Dishkant), a →4 b
def
= b′ →3 a
′
(non-tollens), and a→5 b
def
= (a ∩ b) ∪ (a′ ∩ b) ∪ (a′ ∩ b′)
(relevance). In 1987 Pavicˇic´ [46] proved that an OL in
which we have a →i b = 1 ⇒ a ≤ b, i = 1, . . . , 5 is
an OML. In 1987 Pavicˇic´ [46] also proved that an OL in
which we have a →0 b = 1 ⇒ a ≤ b is a DL. Therefore
5 different but nevertheless equivalent relational logics
could be obtained by linking lattice inequality to 5 im-
plications. With our linking of a single equivalence to
lattice equality this ambiguity is avoided and we obtain
a uniquely defined axiomatic quantum logic. Note that
we have a ≡q b = (a →i b) ∩ (b →i a), i = 1, . . . , 5 in
every OML but not in every OL. End of remarks.
IV. SOUNDNESS AND COMPLETENESS
We shall connect our logics with our lattices so as to
show that the latter are the models of the former.
Definition IV.1 We call M = 〈L, h〉 a model if L is an
algebra and h : F◦ −→ L, called a valuation, is a mor-
phism of formulae F◦ into L, preserving the operations
¬,∨ while turning them into ′,∪.
When L belongs to O6, WOML*, WOML1*,
WOML2*, OML, WDL*, or DL we can informally say
that the model belongs to O6, WOML*, . . . , DL. So,
when we say “for all models in O6, WOML*, . . . , DL,”
that means “for all base sets in O6, WOML*, . . . , DL
and for all valuations on each base set.” “Model” might
refer to a particular pair 〈L, h〉 or to all such pairs with
the base set L, as would follow from the context.
Definition IV.2 We call a formula A ∈ F◦ valid in the
modelM, and write M A, if h(A) = 1 for all valuations
h on the model, i.e., for all h associated with the base set
L of the model. We call a formula A ∈ F◦ a consequence
of Γ ⊆ F◦ in the model M and write Γ M A if h(X) =
1 for all X in Γ implies h(A) = 1, for all valuations h.
A. Soundness
Proving soundness means proving that the axioms
and rules of inference and consequently all theorems of
QL hold in the models of QL. The models of QL are
O6, WOML*, WOML1*, WOML2*, and OML, and of
CL are O6, WDL* and DL. With the exception of O6
which is a special case of both WOML* and WDL*, they
do not properly include each other.
M A and Γ M A are implicitly quantified over all
appropriate lattice models M. Statement “valid” with-
out qualification will mean valid in all appropriate mod-
els.
The theorems IV.1 and IV.2 below show that if A
is a theorem of QL, then A will be valid in O6, and
any WOML*, WOML1*, WOML2*, or OML model, and
if A is a theorem of CL, then A will be valid in O6,
and any WDL* or DL model. In [27, 28] we proved the
soundness for WOML. Since that proof uses no addi-
tional conditions that hold in O6, WOML*, . . . , OML
the proof given there for WOML is a proof of soundness
for O6, WOML*, WOML1*, WOML2*, and OML, as
well. Also, in [27, 28] we proved the soundness for WDL.
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in O6, WDL* and DL, the proof given there for WDL
is a proof of soundness for O6, WDL*, and DL, as well.
Hence, we can prove the soundness of quantum and clas-
sical logic with the help of WOML and WDL conditions
without referring to conditions (31), (30), (35), or (34),
i.e., to any condition in addition to those that hold in the
WOML and WDL themselves.
Theorem IV.1 [Soundness of CL.]
Γ ⊢CL A ⇒ Γ WDL A
Proof. By Theorem 4.3 of [27] any WDL (in particular,
O6, WDL* or DL) is a model for CL. 
Theorem IV.2 [Soundness of QL.]
Γ ⊢QL A ⇒ Γ WOML A
Proof. By Theorem 3.10 of [27] any WOML (in partic-
ular, O6, WOML*, WOML1*, WOML2*, or OML) is a
model for QL. 
Theorems IV.1 and IV.2 express the fact that
Γ ⊢CL A and Γ ⊢QL A in axiomatic logics CL and QL
correspond to a = h(A) = 1 in their lattice models, from
O6 and WOML till WDL. That means that we do not ar-
rive at equations of the form a = b and that starting from
Γ ⊢ A ≡q B we cannot arrive at a = h(A) = b = h(B)
but only at a ≡q b = 1. We can obtain a better un-
derstanding of this through the following properties of
OML and DL. The equational theory of OML consists
of equality conditions Eqs. (19)–(24) together with the
orthomodularity equality condition [28]
a ∪ (a′ ∩ (a ∪ b)) = a ∪ b (38)
which is equivalent to the condition given by Eq. (30).
We now map each of these OML equations, which are of
the form t = s, to the form t ≡q s = 1. This is possible
in any WOML since
a ∪ (a′ ∩ (a ∪ b)) ≡q a ∪ b = 1 (39)
holds in every OL [28] and Eqs. (19)–(24) mapped to
the form t ≡q s = 1 also hold in any OL. Any equa-
tional proof in OML can then be simulated in WOML by
replacing each axiom reference in the OML proof with
its corresponding WOML mapping. Such mapped proofs
will make use of just a proper subset of the equations
that hold in WOML.
It follows that equations of the form t ≡q s = 1,
where t and s are such that t = s holds in OML, can-
not determine OML when added to an OL since all such
forms pass O6 and an OL is an OML if and only if it
does not include a subalgebra isomorphic to O6 [33].
As for CL, the equational theory of distributive or-
tholattices can be simulated by a proper subset of the
equational theory of WDLs since it consists of equality
conditions Eqs. (19)–(24) together with the distributivity
equation
a ∩ (b ∪ c) = (a ∩ b) ∪ (a ∩ c) (40)
which is equivalent to the condition (31). As with WOML
above, we map these algebra conditions of the form t = s
to the conditions of the form t ≡c s = 1, which hold in
any WDL since the weak distributivity condition given
by Eq. (37) holds in any WDL. Any equational proof
in a DL can then be simulated in WDL by replacing
each condition in a DL proof with its correspondingWDL
mapping. Such a mapped proof will use only a proper
subset of the equations that hold in WDL.
Therefore, no set of equations of the form t ≡c s =
1, where t = s holds in DL, can determine a DL when
added to an OL. Such equations hold in WDL and none of
the WDL equations (19)–(24,40) is violated by O6 which
itself violates the distributivity condition [28].
Similar reasoning applies to O6, WOML*, WOML1,
WOML1*, WOML2, and WOML2* which are all
WOMLs and to O6 and WDL* which are WDLs. Sound-
ness applies to them all through WOML and WDL and
which particular model we shall use for QL and CL is
determined by a particular Lindenbaum-Tarski algebra
which we use for the completeness proofs in the next
subsection.
B. Completeness
The soundness of CL and QL in Subsec. IVA shows
that axioms and rules of inference and all theorems from
CL and QL hold in any WOML. The completeness of
CL and QL shows the opposite, i.e., that we can impose
the structures of O6, WDL* and DL, and O6, WOML*,
WOML1*, WOML2*, and OML on the sets F◦ of formu-
lae of CL and QL, respectively. But here, as opposed to
the soundness proof, we shall have as many completeness
proofs as there are models. The completeness proofs for
O6, WOML*, WOML1*, and WOML2* can be inferred
neither from the proof for OML nor from the proofs for
the other three models. The same holds for O6, WDL*
and DL.
To establish a correspondence between formulae of
QL and CL and conditions of O6, WOML*, WOML1*,
WOML2*, and OML, and O6, WDL*, and DL, respec-
tively, we make use of an equivalence relation compatible
with the operations in QL and CL, i.e., a relation of
congruence. The resulting equivalence classes stand for
elements of these lattices and enable the completeness
proof of QL and CL for them.
The definition of the congruence relation involves a
special set of valuations on lattices O6, O7, and O8 (see
Fig. 1) called O6, O7, and O8.
Definition IV.3 Letting Oi, i=6,7,8, represent the lat-
tices from Figure 1, we define Oi as the set of all map-
pings oi : F
◦ −→ Oi such that for A,B ∈ F◦, oi(¬A) =
oi(A)
′, and oi(A ∨B) = oi(A) ∪ oi(B).
Oi, i = 6, 7, 8 enable us to distinguish the equiva-
lence classes used for the completeness proof, so that the
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and WOML2*.
We achieve that by conjoining the term (∀oi ∈
Oi){[(∀X ∈ Γ)(oi(X) = 1)] ⇒ [oi(A) = oi(B)]}, i=6,7,8,
to the definition of the equivalence relation so that the
valuations of wffs A and B map to the same point in
the lattice Oi whenever the valuations oi of the wffs
in Γ are all 1. Thus, e.g., in O6 wffs A ∨ B and
A∨(¬A∧(A∨B)) become members of two separate equiv-
alence classes, what by Theorem IV.9 below, amounts to
non-orthomodularity of WOML. If it were not for the
conjoined term, the two wffs would belong to the same
equivalence class. Conjoined terms provide a complete-
ness proof that is not in any way dependent on the or-
thomodular law. Therefore to prove the completeness
the underlying models need not be orthomodular. The
equivalence classes so defined work for WOML1*, and
WOML2* as well since O7 will let Eq. (34) through
but will let through neither the orthomodularity, nor
Eq. (35), and O8 will let through neither the orthomod-
ularity, nor Eq. (35), nor Eq. (34).
O6 will also let us refine the equivalence class
used for the completeness proof of CL, so that the
Lindenbaum-Tarski algebras be O6 and WDL*.
To obtain OML and DL Lindenbaum algebras we
make use of the standard equivalence classes without the
conjoined terms.
All these equivalence classes are relations of congru-
ence.
Theorem IV.3 The relations of equivalence ≈Γ,QL,i,
i = 6, 7, 8, or simply ≈i, i = 6, 7, 8, defined as
A ≈i B
def
= Γ ⊢ A ≡q B & (∀oi ∈ Oi)
[(∀X ∈ Γ)(oi(X) = 1)⇒ oi(A) = oi(B)]
i = 6, 7, 8. (41)
are relations of congruence, where Γ ⊆ F◦.
Proof. Let us first prove that ≈ is an equivalence re-
lation. A ≈ A follows from A1 [Eq. (6)] of system QL
and the identity law of equality. If Γ ⊢ A ≡ B, we can
detach the left-hand side of A12 to conclude Γ ⊢ B ≡ A,
through the use of A13 and repeated uses of A14 and
R1. From this and commutativity of equality, we con-
clude A ≈ B ⇒ B ≈ A. (For brevity we will mostly
not mention further uses of A12, A13, A14, and R1 in
what follows.) The proof of transitivity runs as follows
(i = 6, 7, 8).
A ≈ B & B ≈ C (42)
⇒ Γ ⊢ A ≡ B & Γ ⊢ B ≡ C
& (∀o ∈ Oi)[(∀X ∈ Γ)(o(X) = 1) ⇒ o(A) = o(B)]
& (∀o ∈ Oi)[(∀X ∈ Γ)(o(X) = 1) ⇒ o(B) = o(C)]
⇒ Γ ⊢ A ≡ C
& (∀o ∈ Oi)[(∀X ∈ Γ)(o(X) = 1)
⇒ o(A) = o(B) & o(B) = o(C)]
⇒ Γ ⊢ A ≡ C
& (∀o ∈ Oi)[(∀X ∈ Γ)(o(X) = 1) ⇒ o(A) = o(C)]
⇒ A ≈ C
Γ ⊢ A ≡ C above follows from A2 and the metaconjunc-
tion in the second but last line reduces to o(A) = o(C)
by transitivity of equality.
In order to be a relation of congruence, the relation of
equivalence must be compatible with the operations ¬
and ∨. These proofs run as follows (i = 6, 7, 8).
A ≈ B (43)
⇒ Γ ⊢ A ≡ B
& (∀o ∈ Oi)[(∀X ∈ Γ)(o(X) = 1) ⇒ o(A) = o(B)]
⇒ Γ ⊢ ¬A ≡ ¬B
& (∀o ∈ Oi)[(∀X ∈ Γ)(o(X) = 1) ⇒ o(A)′ = o(B)′]
⇒ Γ ⊢ ¬A ≡ ¬B
& (∀o ∈ Oi)[(∀X ∈ Γ)(o(X) = 1) ⇒ o(¬A) = o(¬B)]
⇒ ¬A ≈ ¬B
A ≈ B (44)
⇒ Γ ⊢ A ≡ B
& (∀o ∈ Oi)[(∀X ∈ Γ)(o(X) = 1) ⇒ o(A) = o(B)]
⇒ Γ ⊢ (A ∨C) ≡ (B ∨C)
& (∀o ∈ Oi)[(∀X ∈ Γ)(o(X) = 1)
⇒ o(A) ∪ o(C) = o(B) ∪ o(C)]
⇒ (A ∨ C) ≈ (B ∨ C)
In the second step of Eq. 43, we used A3. In the second
step of Eq. 44, we used A4 and A10. For the quantified
part of these expressions, we applied the definition of Oi,
i = 6, 7, 8. 
Theorem IV.4 The relation of equivalence ≈Γ,QL,1, or
simply ≈1, defined as
A ≈1 B
def
= Γ ⊢ A ≡q B (45)
is a relation of congruence, where Γ ⊆ F◦.
Proof. The proof for the relation of equivalence given
by Eq. (45) is the well-known standard one. 
Theorem IV.5 The relation of equivalence ≈Γ,CL,6, or
simply ≈6¯, defined as
A ≈6¯ B
def
= Γ ⊢ A ≡c B & (∀o6 ∈ Oi)
[(∀X ∈ Γ)(o6(X) = 1)⇒ o6(A) = o6(B)] (46)
is a relation of congruence, where Γ ⊆ F◦.
Proof. As given in [28] 
Theorem IV.6 The relation of equivalence ≈Γ,CL,2, or
simply ≈2, defined as
A ≈2 B
def
= Γ ⊢ A ≡c B (47)
is a relation of congruence, where Γ ⊆ F◦.
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by Eq. (47) is the well-known standard one. 
Definition IV.4 The equivalence classes for a wff A un-
der the relation of equivalence ≈ given by Eqs. (41), (45),
(46), and (47) are defined as |A| = {B ∈ F◦ : A ≈ B},
and we denote F◦/≈ = {|A| : A ∈ F◦}. The equivalence
classes define the natural morphism f : F◦ −→ F◦/≈,
which gives f(A) =def |A|. We write a = f(A),
b = f(B), etc.
Lemma IV.1 The relation a = b on F◦/≈ is given by:
|A| = |B| ⇔ A ≈ B (48)
Lemma IV.2 The Lindenbaum-Tarski algebras Aj =
〈F◦/ ≈j ,¬/ ≈j ,∨/ ≈j〉, j = 6, 7, 8, 1, 6¯, 2 are WOML*
(or O6), or WOML1*, or WOML2*, or OML, or WDL*
(or O6), or DL, i.e., Eqs. (19)–(24) and (33), or (34), or
(35), or (30), or (36), or (31) hold for ¬/≈j and ∨/≈j,
j = 6, 7, 8, 1, 6¯, 2, as ′ and ∪, respectively.
Proof. To prove the Γ ⊢ A ≡ B part of the A ≈ B defi-
nition, we prove of the ortholattice conditions, Eqs. (19)–
(24), from A9, the dual of A7, the dual of A5, etc.,
analogous to the similar proofs in [28] and [38]). For
Eqs. (34) and (35) we use Lemma 3.5 from Ref. [27] ac-
cording to which any t = 1 condition that holds in OML
also holds in any WOML. Program beran [40] shows
that the expressions ((a →1 b) ≡ (b →1 a)) ≡ (a ≡ b)
and ((a ≡ b)′ →1 a
′) ≡ (a →1 b) reduce to 1 in an
OML. By the aforementioned Lemma 3.5 this means
that ((a →1 b) ≡ (b →1 a)) ≡ (a ≡ b) = 1 and
((a ≡ b)′ →1 a
′) ≡ (a→1 b) = 1 in any WOML. Now the
Γ ⊢ A ≡ B part from Eq. (41) forces these WOML con-
ditions into Eqs. (34) and (35). For the quantified part
of the A ≈ B definition, lattice O6 is a (proper) WOML.
For the OML, we carry out the proof with the relation
of equivalence without the quantified part in Eq. (41).
Then the Γ ⊢ A ≡ B part from Eq. (41) forces the con-
dition (a∪ (a′ ∩ (a∪ b))) ≡ (a∪ b) = 1 which holds in any
ortholattice into the OM law given by Eq. (30). 
We stress here that the Lindenbaum-Tarski algebras
Aj , j = 6, 7, 8, 6¯ from Lemma IV.2 will be uniquely as-
signed to QL and CL via Theorems IV.11 and IV.12 in
the sense that we have to use the relations of congruence
given by Eqs. (41,46) and that we cannot use those given
by Eqs. (45,47). For Aj , j = 1, 2 we have to use the latter
ones and we cannot use the former ones. This is in con-
trast to the completeness proof given in [27] where we
did not consider the set-theoretical difference WOML*
but only WOML. But since WOML contains OML (un-
like WOML*), in [27] (unlike in this paper), in [27] we
could have used both relations of congruence (41) and
(45) to prove the completeness. Here, with WOML* we
can only use (41). We see that the usage of set-theoretical
differences in this paper establishes a correlation between
lattice models and equivalence relations for a considered
logic as shown in Fig. 2.
Lemma IV.3 In the Lindenbaum-Tarski algebra A, if
f(X) = 1 for all X in Γ implies f(A) = 1, then Γ ⊢ A.
Proof. Let us assume that f(X) = 1 X ∈ Γ implies
f(A) = 1 i.e., |A| = 1 = |A| ∪ |A|′ = |A ∨ ¬A|, where
the 1st equality follows from Def. IV.4, the 2nd one from
Eq. (25) (the definition of 1 in OL) and the 3rd one from
the fact that ≈ is a congruence. Hence A ≈ (A ∨ ¬A),
which means Γ ⊢ A ≡ (A ∨ ¬A) & (∀o ∈ O6)[(∀X ∈
Γ)(o(X) = 1) ⇒ o(A) = o((A ∨ ¬A))]. The same holds
for O7 and O8. When we drop the second conjunct, this
yields Γ ⊢ A ≡ (A ∨ ¬A). Now, in any OL, we have
a ≡ (a∪ a′) = a. By mapping the steps of a proof of this
lattice identity to steps of a proof in the logic, we prove
⊢ (A ≡ (A ∨ ¬A)) ≡ A from QL axioms A2–A14. By
detaching the left-hand side, with the help of A12, A13,
A14, and R1, we arrive at Γ ⊢ A. 
Theorem IV.7 The orthomodular law does not hold in
Aj, j = 6, 7, 8, for models WOML* (O6), WOML1*, and
WOML2*.
Proof. We assume F◦ contains at least 2 primitive
propositions p0, p1, . . .. Let us pick up a valuation o that
maps two of them, A and B, to distinct nodes o(A) and
o(B) of O6 which are neither 0 nor 1 such that o(A) ≤
o(B), meaning that o(A) and o(B) are on the same side
of O6 in Fig.1]. In O6, as we can see from Fig.1], we have
o(A)∪ o(B) = o(B) and o(A)∪ (o(A)′ ∩ (o(A)∪ o(B))) =
o(A) ∪ (o(A)′ ∩ o(B)) = o(A) ∪ 0 = o(A). Therefore
o(A)∪o(B) 6= o(A)∪(o(A)′∩(o(A)∪o(B)), i.e., o(A∨B) 6=
o(A ∨ (¬A ∧ (A ∨ B))). This falsifies (A ∨ B) ≈ (A ∨
(¬A∧(A∨B)) which is actually very the orthomodularity
[46, 47]. Hence, a∪b 6= a∪(a′∩(a∪b)), what amounts to
an counterexample to the orthomodular law for F◦/≈.
We can follow the steps given above by taking o(A) = x
and o(B) = y in Fig. 1(a). For O7 and O8 the proofs are
analogous. For instance, the orthomodularity is violated
in Fig. 1(b) for o(A) = x and o(B) = y and in Fig. 1(c)
for o(A) = w and o(B) = y. 
Theorem IV.8 The orthomodular law holds in A1 for
an OML model.
Proof. Well-known. 
Theorem IV.9 The distributive law does not hold in
A6¯, for WDL* (O6).
Proof. As given in [28]. 
Eric Schechter [30, Sec. 9.4] gives a set valued in-
terpretation to O6 by assigning {−1, 0, 1,} to 1 in our
Fig. 1(a), {−1, 0} to y, {0,1} to x′, {−1} to x, {1} to
y′, and ∅ to 0, and calls it the hexagon interpretation.
“The hexagon interpretation is not distributive. That
fact came as a surprise to some logicians, since the two-
valued logic itself is distributive.” [30, Sec. 9.5] Schechter
also gives crystal (6 subsets) and Church’s diamond (4
subsets) set valued interpretations of CL in his Secs. 9.7.-
13. and 9.14.-17.
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DL model (Boolean algebra).
Proof. Well-known. 
Lemma IV.4 MAj = 〈Aj , f〉, j = 6, 7, 8, 1, 6¯, 2, is
a proper WOML* (O6), WOML1*, WOML2*, OML,
WDL* (O6), or DL model.
Proof. Follows from Lemma IV.2. 
Now we are able to prove the completeness of QL
and CL, i.e., that if a formula A is a consequence of a set
of wffs Γ in all O6, WOML*, WOML1*, WOML2*, and
OML models and in all O6, WDL*, and DL models then
Γ ⊢QL A and Γ ⊢CL A, respectively. In particular, when
Γ = ∅, all valid formulae are provable in QL.
Theorem IV.11 [Completeness of quantum logic]
Γ MAj A ⇒ Γ ⊢QL A, j = 6, 7, 8, 1.
Proof. Γ M A means that in all WOML* (O6),
WOML1*, WOML2*, and OML models M, if f(X) = 1
for allX in Γ, then f(A) = 1 holds. In particular, it holds
for MA = 〈A, f〉, which is a WOML* (O6), WOML1*,
WOML2*, or OML model by Lemma IV.4. Therefore,
in the Lindenbaum-Tarski algebra A, if f(X) = 1 for all
X in Γ, then f(A) = 1 holds. By Lemma IV.3, it follows
that Γ ⊢ A. 
Theorem IV.12 [Completeness of classical logic]
Γ MAj A ⇒ Γ ⊢CL A, j = 6¯, 2.
Proof. As given in [28]. 
V. DISCUSSION
We have shown that quantum and classical ax-
iomatic logics are metastructures for dealing with differ-
ent algebras, in our case lattices, as their models. On the
one hand, well formed formulas in logic can be mapped to
equations in different lattices, and on the other, equations
from one lattice, we are more familiar with, or which is
simpler, or easier to handle, can be translated into equa-
tions of another lattice, through the logic which they are
both models of.
In Section IV we proved that quantum logic can be
modelled by five different lattice models only one of which
is orthomodular and that classical logic can be modelled
by at least three lattice models only one of which is
distributive. As we conjectured in [38] and partly con-
firmed by means of the two new models (WOML1* and
WOML2*) presented in this paper, there might be many
more, possibly infinitely many, different lattice models
quantum and classical axiomatic logics can be modelled
with. (See also the remarks below Theorem IV.9.)
The models known to us so far are presented in a
chart in Fig. 2. The key step that allows the multiplicity
of lattice models for both logics is the refinement of the
equivalence relations for the Lindenbaum-Tarski algebras
in Theorems IV.3, IV.4, IV.5, and IV.6. They are also
given in the chart where we can see that two different
equivalence relations enable O6 to be a model of both
quantum and classical logic. This is possible because
both the weak orthomodularity (33) and the weak dis-
tributivity (37) pass O6 as pointed out below Def. III.13.
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FIG. 2. Lattice models of quantum and classical logics to-
gether with the corresponding equivalence relations which de-
fine their Lindenbaum-Tarski algebras.
The essence of the equivalence classes of the
Lindenbaum-Tarski algebras is that they are determined
by special simple lattices, e.g., those shown in Fig. 1, in
which conditions that define particular other lattice mod-
els, fail. The failure is significant because it proves that
the orthomodularity (30) of OML is not needed to prove
the completeness of quantum logic for WOML2*, that
neither the orthomodularity (30), nor condition (35) is
needed to prove the completeness for WOML1*, and that
neither the orthomodularity (30), nor condition (35), nor
condition (34) is needed for WOML*.
With today’s computational technology we employ
only bits and qubits which correspond to two-valued DL
(digital, binary, two-valued Boolean algebra) and OML,
respectively. This means that their possible valuations
are reduced to {TRUE,FALSE} valuation for classical com-
putation, i.e., when we implement classical logic, and
to Hasse diagrams for quantum computation when we
implement quantum logic [41]. So, it would be inter-
esting to investigate how other valuations, i.e., various
WOMLs and WDLs, can be implemented in complex cir-
cuits. That would provide us with the possibility of con-
trolling essentially different algebraic structures (models)
implemented into radically different hardware (logic cir-
cuits consisting of logic gates) by the same logic that we
use today with the standard bit and qubit gate technol-
ogy.
With these possible applications of quantum and
classical logics we come back to the question which we
started with: “Is Logic Empirical?” We have seen that
logic is not uniquely empirical since it can simultaneously
describe distinct realities. However, we have also seen
(cf. Fig. 2) that by means of chosen relations of equiva-
lence we can link particular kinds of “empirical” models
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to quantum logic on the one hand and to classical logic,
on the other. Let us therefore briefly review the most re-
cent elaborations on the question given by Bacciagaluppi
[48] and Baltag and Smets [19]. They state: “Quantum
logic is suitable as a logic that locally replaces classical
logic when used to describe “a class of propositions in
the context of quantum mechanical experiments”.”
Our results show that this point can be supported as
follows. The propositions of quantum logic correspond to
elements of a Hilbert lattice and are not directly linked to
measurement values. Such logic employs models which
evaluate particular combinations of propositions and tell
us whether they are true or not. Evaluation means
mapping from a set of propositions to lattice through
which a correspondence with measurement values indi-
rectly emerge. Since the strongest algebra (i.e., not O6,
or WOML*, or WOML1*, or WOML2*, or . . . ?) must be
an orthomodular lattice but cannot be a Boolean algebra,
we can say that quantum logic which has an orthomod-
ular lattice as one of its models is “empirical” whenever
we theoretically describe quantum measurements, simply
because it can be linked to a model which serves for such
a description: an orthomodular Hilbert lattice, i.e., the
lattice of closed subspaces of a complex Hilbert space.
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